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The conjunction of rights with responsibilities has been a staple of
anti-rights rhetoric for generations. Those who think that rights have
gone too far typically seek to "remind" us that rights entail
responsibilities. With equal force, they then urge changes in the law
that decrease the scope or strength of the rights to which they object
and increase the legal responsibilities of the right-holders. This
increase in responsibilities has the desired effect, even by itself, of
making the right both smaller and weaker than it had previously been.
I begin this Article on contemporary cable television regulation
with these abstract observations on the rhetoric and structure of rights
because the subject of cable television is a prime example of the
phenomenon I have just described. The phenomenon is perhaps best
exemplified in the public and political discourse surrounding the
recent legislation, regulations, and litigation regarding so-called
"indecent" programming on leased and public access channels. As
with anti-rights rhetoric generally, the subject of the rights of cable
operators has become legally and rhetorically intertwined with the
subject of the editorial responsibilities and potential legal liability of
those same operators.
My goal here is not to relitigate recent court cases, in particular
Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC.' I will leave it to the
litigators to litigate, and leave it to the courts to reach their own
decisions. My goal, in some sense, is a bit larger. For although I will
talk at some length about the current contretemps regarding the
indecency regulations, I think it important to see these regulations and
the surrounding controversy as examples of a question likely to
endure even after this particular dispute is resolved, and even after
the Supreme Court's decision in Turner Broadcasting. That question
concerns the legal responsibilities of cable operators generally for the
content of their programming. Especially in light of the public
concern with violence on television, it would be a mistake to think
that the question of cable operators' editorial responsibility is one
with a short shelf life. In trying to analyze this question, therefore, I
hope to say things that will be useful when, as I think it will, the
question turns to topics other than that of indecency.
I
I want to begin with a few more observations concerning the logi-
cal and rhetorical relationship between rights and responsibilities.
1. 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994), vacating and remanding 819 F. Supp. 32 (D.D.C. 1993),
reh'g denied, 115 S. Ct. 30 (1994).
HASTINGS COMIENT L.J. [Vol. 17:161
CABLE OPERATORS AS EDITORS
The rhetorical relationship is well-known, and one sees it these days
almost as much in serious commentary as in popular political debate.2
Yet a recurring feature of that rhetoric seeks to suggest that the rela-
tionship between rights and responsibilities is a logical or necessary
one. At times we see the language of formal logic, as with the phrase
"rights entail responsibilities," and even more often we see essentially
the same claim made in the language of conceptual necessity-"rights
carry responsibilities"-claiming that it is a necessary feature of rights
that they bring with them commensurate responsibilities.
This proposition is utter nonsense. Legal rights do not bring legal
responsibilities. Rather, they free the right-holder from them.' Rec-
ognition of a constitutional right to privacy does not produce constitu-
tional or legal responsibilities for those who gain the right to privacy.
If the Supreme Court were to reverse Bowers v. Hardwick,4 the deci-
sion would not increase the responsibilities of those who engage in
consensual sexual conduct that some people deem immoral. Rather,
the reversal of Bowers would do precisely the opposite by decreasing
the responsibilities of the right-holders to conform their consensual
sexual activities to the wishes of others or the state. When the Court
decided Miranda v. Arizona,' neither Ernesto Miranda nor any other
criminal defendant took on new responsibilities. Only the police had
new responsibilities as a result of the decision. Miranda is thus a good
example of the Hohfeldian6 point that rights and responsibilities are
correlative. Individual rights necessarily require that someone else
have the responsibility to respect them. In the area of free speech, the
same phenomenon can be seen. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan7 in-
creased the rights of the press just by decreasing its legal responsibili-
ties and potential liability in defamation cases. Shield laws,8 which
2. See, e.g., MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLIT-
ICAL DISCOURSE (1991).
3. See John Finnis, Some Professorial Fallacies About Rights, 4 ADEL. L. REV. 377
(1972); Frederick Schauer, Can Rights be Abused?, 31 PHIL. Q. 223 (1981).
4. 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (rejecting due process and equal protection challenges to
Georgia's prohibition of homosexual sodomy).
5. 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (establishing obligation of police to advise arrestees of their
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and their Sixth Amendment right to
counsel).
6. Wesley N. Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reason-
ing, 26 YALE L.J. 710 (1917); Wesley N. Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as
Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913).
7. 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (holding that First Amendment prohibited imposition of civil
liability in public figure defamation cases unless shown with convincing clarity that the
defendant published with actual knowledge of falsehood).
8. The various state statutes are collected in In re Roche, 411 N.E.2d 466, 474 n.13
(Mass. 1980). Federal guidelines to the same end are codified at 28 C.F.R. § 50.10 (1993).
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allow journalists to protect their sources, accomplish their ends pre-
cisely by eliminating what would otherwise be the responsibility of
any citizen with knowledge of criminal activity to comply with a
subpoena.
Once we recognize that the relationship of legal rights to legal
responsibilities is one of disjunction (with respect to the right-holder
herself) and not of conjunction, we can understand that those who
make the claim that rights entail responsibilities are commonly seek-
ing not to complete a logical relationship, but rather to restrict the
scope or strength of some right. To claim that cable operators have or
should have legal responsibilities for the content of their programming
is simply to claim that cable operators should have fewer rights and
less editorial freedom than would otherwise be the case. This position
is certainly plausible, even though in this context it is not my position.
But it is far less plausible and far less acceptable in terms of argumen-
tative honesty to suggest that this conclusion flows logically or quasi-
logically from the very nature of the right, or from the fact that cable
operators have rights.
Although it is a mistake to attribute logical status to the conjunc-
tion of rights with responsibilities, the claim of conjunction becomes
more plausible if we see it as an argument for the lack of a relation-
ship between the existence of a right and the nonexistence of nonlegal
responsibilities in the exercise of that right. Anyone who has been
infuriated by reporters who take their First Amendment rights to be
an immunity from criticism, or by reporters who believe that they
should do everything the First Amendment gives them a legal and
constitutional right to do, recognizes the point I am trying to make
here. Rights can be exercised wrongly, in the political, moral, or so-
cial sense of "wrong." Moreover, widening the scope of legal rights
widens the scope of legally protected behavior, and thus necessarily
increases the possibility of people engaging in morally wrong conduct.
If the scope of free speech rights were narrower, we would likely have
fewer Nazi marches,9 fewer cross-burnings, ° fewer racial epithets,"
General discussions include Alfred Hill, Testimonial Privilege and Fair Trial, 80 COLUM. L.
REv. 1173 (1980) and Carl C. Monk, Evidentiary Privilege for Journalists' Sources: Theory
and Statutory Protection, 51 Mo. L. REV. 1 (1986).
9. See Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1206 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916
(1978) (protecting right of neo-Nazi party to march in the public streets, even where march
site was selected because of presence of Holocaust survivors).
10. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2547 (1992) (striking down on First
Amendment grounds application of a hate crime ordinance to cross-burning).
11. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam) (implicitly protecting
use of racial epithets by protecting advocacy of racial violence that falls short of incitement
to likely imminent unlawful action).
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and fewer denials of the Holocaust. 2 Thus, it may be that the very
existence of broad free speech rights increases the number of opportu-
nities to engage in wrongful or harmful conduct just as it increases the
number of opportunities to engage in valuable conduct. Moreover,
broad free speech rights increase the opportunities for people to urge
that those rights be exercised with an attention to the moral and polit-
ical responsibilities of the right-holder, responsibilities that are neither
extinguished nor diminished by giving the conduct the legal immunity
that we call a right. If cable operators had First Amendment editorial
freedom akin to the editorial freedom recognized for newspapers in
Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo,'3 it would not and ought not
to prevent us from criticizing the operators when they use that free-
dom to become, for example, the accomplices and instruments of
those who would endorse or encourage violence against women.' 4
There is no logical error in believing that legal rights and nonlegal
responsibilities can operate in tandem. However, there is some rea-
son to believe that increases in rights, even when justified, will in-
crease the opportunities for morally irresponsible behavior and thus
increase the need to call for nonlegal responsibility in the exercise of
legal rights.
II
Now I want to apply my discussion in Part I to some current con-
troversies regarding the editorial responsibilities of cable operators.
As I indicated at the outset, the topic has become salient in part be-
12. Although it is not seriously maintained under First Amendment doctrine that
those who deny the Holocaust could be punished, the doctrine is different elsewhere. See,
e.g., R. v. Keegstra, 3 S.C.R. 697 (Can. 1990).
13. 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974) (striking down right-of-reply law as unconstitutionally
interfering with editorial freedom of newspaper).
14. The likelihood of recognition of such rights is slim after Turner Broadcasting Sys.,
Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994), vacating and remanding 819 F.Supp. 32 (D.D.C. 1993),
reh'g denied, 115 S. Ct. 30 (1994). Although the Court there recognized that the must-
carry regulations "interfere with cable operators' editorial discretion by compelling them
to offer carriage to a certain minimum number of broadcast stations," id. at 2460, the Court
largely rejected, at least with respect to arguably content-neutral restrictions, the analogy
between cable operators and the newspapers in Tornillo:
[T~he asserted analogy to Tornillo ignores an important technological difference
between newspapers and cable television. Although a daily newspaper and a
cable operator both may enjoy monopoly status in a given locale, the cable opera-
tor exercises far greater control over access to the relevant medium .... [Slimply
by virtue of its ownership of the essential pathway for cable speech, a cable oper-
ator can prevent its subscribers from obtaining access to programming it chooses
to exclude. A cable operator, unlike speakers in other media, can thus silence the
voice of competing speakers with the mere flick of the switch.
Id. at 2466 (Kennedy, J.).
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cause of the "indecency" issue, although it is likely to be with us long
after that controversy goes away (if it ever does). Moreover, although
the Court's decision in Turner Broadcasting dampens the prospects of
an argument based on Tornillo advocating strong First Amendment
editorial rights for cable operators,' 5 the issues the Court left un-
resolved will keep this subject on the table for the time being.
So let me provide a brief survey of some other recent legal devel-
opments, even though it is likely familiar terrain. Under the Cable
Communications Policy Act of 1984,16 cable operators were required
to provide certain services by way of leased access and public access. 7
Consistent with the concept of mandatory access, operators were pro-
hibited, by what is now 47 U.S.C. section 532, from exercising editorial
control over the programming on public' 8 access or leased 9 access
channels. 20 Because it would be anomalous to hold cable operators
legally responsible for content over which they were prohibited from
exercising editorial control, Congress immunized cable operators from
liability based on the content of leased access or public access chan-
nels. 21 The immunity specifically extends to libel, slander, obscenity,
incitement, invasions of privacy, and false or misleading advertising.
Although this immunity undoubtedly gave a measure of security
to cable operators, its practical importance should not be exaggerated.
Even without the statutory immunity, the legal liability of a transmit-
ter of communications based on the content of communications pro-
duced by others is simply not an important part of the American
jurisprudential terrain. Take libel and slander, for example, an in-
triguing place to start since New York Times Co. v. Sullivan22 itself is
closely analogous to the position of the cable operator. Recall, after
all, that the New York Times did nothing other than print a paid ad-
vertisement prepared by others. Still, the constitutional standards for
the imposition of civil or criminal liability after Sullivan and Garrison
v. Louisiana23 are themselves so narrow as to make the potential for
defamation liability relatively small. 24 Given that in cases involving
15. See Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 256-58.
16. 47 U.S.C. §§ 521-529 (1988).
17. Id. §§ 531-532.
18. Id. § 531(e).
19. Id. § 532(c)(2).
20. See Playboy Enters. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 906 F.2d 25, 27 (1st Cir. 1990).
21. 47 U.S.C. § 558 (1988).
22. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
23. 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964) (holding that standards from Sullivan apply with "no less"
force to actions for criminal libel).
24. On the actual likelihood of defamation liability, see Frederick Schauer, Uncou-
pling Free Speech, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1321 (1992) and the various articles in THE COST OF
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public figures or public officials, the existing First Amendment stan-
dards prohibit the imposition of liability on anyone without actual ad-
vance knowledge of falsity, it is probable that the prospect of liability
for cable operators in such cases would be minuscule.2" This proposi-
tion holds even when we factor in the lower negligence standard appli-
cable to cases brought by those who are neither public officials nor
public figures,26 and even when we take account of the "deep-pock-
ets" phenomenon pursuant to which the cable operator would likely
be viewed as having the greatest ability to pay. It is still unlikely that
many defamation plaintiffs will be able. to show negligence on the part
of the cable operator, since mandatory access appears to preclude any
possible finding of negligence. Cases may arise in which someone
who does as the law orders is for that reason found to be negligent,27
but this is not likely to be one of them.
Similar conclusions apply to other possible bases for cable opera-
tor liability. With respect to incitement to unlawful action or with re-
spect to communications indirectly causing physical harm, the
stringency of the rule in Brandenburg v. Ohio28 also eliminates the
likelihood of cable operator liability since Brandenburg precludes lia-
bility except in cases of intentional and likely effective incitement to
imminent lawless action. For example, NBC, in Olivia N. v. NBC,
29
might be analogized to a cable operator, insofar as NBC served as a
conduit for programming prepared by others. When one of its pro-
grams, the made-for-television movie Born Innocent, became the
"but-for" cause of a sexual assault by a group of teenagers who com-
mitted a "copycat" crime, the California courts held that Brandenburg
precluded liability except in those cases in which it could be shown
that the defendant had actually desired or intended physical harm to
occur. This result, consistent with results in other cases,3" should
LIBEL: ECONOMIC AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS (Everette E. Dennis & Eli M. Noam eds.,
1989).
25. As to the "reckless disregard" component of Sullivan, even that seeming relaxa-
tion of the rigor of the intentional falsehood requirement requires that there "must be
sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained serious
doubts as to the truth of his publication." St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731
(1968).
26. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 348-49 (1974).
27. An intriguing example is described in Ronald J. Allen, Foreword: The Nature of
Discretion, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (1984).
28. 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).
29. 126 Cal. App. 3d 488 (1981), cert. denied sub nom. Niemi v. NBC, 458 U.S. 1108
(1982).
30. See, e.g., Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 814 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 485 U.S. 959 (1988); Walt Disney Prods., Inc. v. Shannon, 276 S.E.2d 580 (1981).
See generally John L. Diamond & James L. Primm, Rediscovering Traditional Tort Typolo-
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make it clear once again that even in the absence of section 558, cable
operators should have little to fear from potential incitement liability.
Finally, consider the question of obscenity. Section 588 aside, the
substantive legal standards as they now exist again make the likeli-
hood of cable operator liability quite small. This is especially impor-
tant because Section 10(d) of the Cable Television Consumer
Protection and Competition Act of 199231 (1992 Cable Act) explicitly
amends 47 U.S.C. section 558 by adding the phrase "unless the pro-
gram involves obscene material." As a consequence, we are no longer
in the realm of the hypothetical.
Still, like the exclusion of obscenity in the reauthorization of
funding for the National Endowment for the Arts, the exclusion of
obscenity from section 558 immunity seems more symbolic than any-
thing else. After Jenkins v. Georgia,32 which put to rest the unfounded
idea that obscenity was anything a local community said it was, ob-
scenity convictions in the United States have been rare. What few
convictions there are have been of large-scale dealers of the kind of
material found only in the corners of the most explicit adults-only es-
tablishments. This discussion is not intended to be a debate over
whether the obscenity laws should be broadened, as some people be-
lieve, or narrowed (as I and others33 believe), or eliminated entirely.
Rather, it is simply a report of the existing state of legal doctrine and
prosecutorial practice. As such, the elimination of the obscenity ex-
clusion from section 558 is not likely to affect significantly the possibil-
ity of cable operator liability. Accordingly, the elimination is also
unlikely significantly to affect cable operator practice.
gies to Determine Media Liability for Physical Injuries: From the Mickey Mouse Club to
Hustler Magazine, 10 HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. 969 (1988); Michael P. Kopech, Shouting
"INCITEMENT!" in the Courtroom: An Evolving Theory of Civil Liability?, 19 ST. MARY'S
L.J. 173 (1987); Frederick Schauer, Mrs. Palsgraf and the First Amendment, 47 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 161 (1990).
31. Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 47
U.S.C.) [hereinafter 1992 Cable Act].
32. 418 U.S. 153 (1974). In Jenkins, then-Associate Justice Rehnquist, writing for a
unanimous Supreme Court, made it clear that the movie Carnal Knowledge could not be
found to appeal to the prurient interest, nor to be patently offensive to contemporary com-
munity standards, regardless of the views of the people, courts, or legislature of the State of
Georgia. Id. Moreover, the third prong of the test for obscenity set out in Miller v. Cali-
fornia, 413 U.S. 15, 26 (1973), which precludes from the category of the legally obscene any
material having "serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value," has never been mea-
sured against local (as opposed to national) standards. Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497
(1987); Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291 (1977).
33. See Frederick Schauer, Causation Theory and the Causes of Sexual Violence, AM.
B. FOUND. RES. J. 737 (1987).
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Other areas of potential cable operator liability are perhaps not
as clear. Liability for false, misleading, or harmful advertisements, for
example, is a theoretical possibility. So, too, are actions for invasion
of privacy. Still, the existing state of the law with respect to conduits
generally, whether broadcasters, cable operators, or print publishers,
is such that attempting to address the possibility of cable operator lia-
bility based on the content of the materials transmitted on public ac-
cess or leased access is not likely to be fruitful.
The indecency issue, however, is a different kettle of fish.34 In
discussing the issue, I again begin with a brief recapitulation of the
existing statutory scheme. In so doing, I will not describe the statutes,
regulations, or judicial decisions with the same degree of detail as in
Professor Meyerson's contribution to this Symposium. 35 Still, it is
worth noting a few high points.
Although Section 10 of the 1992 Cable Act eliminated obscenity
immunity from cable operator liability, its primary focus was on "inde-
cency."' 36 In contrast to the previous prohibition on cable operator
editorial control over public access or leased access programming,
Section 10(a) of the 1992 Cable Act permits "a cable operator to en-
force prospectively a written and published policy of prohibiting pro-
gramming that the cable operator reasonably believes describes or
depicts sexual or excretory activities or organs in a patently offensive
manner as measured by contemporary community standards.
'37
Although Section 10(a) contains permissive rather than mandatory
language, Section 10(b) requires the FCC to promulgate regulations
"designed to limit the access of children to indecent programming, as
defined by Commission regulations, and which cable operators have
not voluntarily prohibited under [Section 10(a)]. '38 More specifically,
the regulations must require that all indecent programs be placed on
the same channel and must also require that the channel be blocked
unless the subscriber specifically requests access in writing. Further,
the regulations must require that all programmers notify cable opera-
34. See Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 932 F.2d 1504 (D.C. Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 1281 (1992); Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 852 F.2d 1332
(D.C. Cir. 1988).
35. Michael I. Meyerson, The First Amendment and FCC Rule Making Under the 1992
Cable Act, 17 HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. 179 (1994).
36. 1992 Cable Act, supra note 31, § 10 (codified at scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.
(Supp. IV 1992)).
37. Id. § 10(a).
38. Id. § 10(b).
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tors of the presence of any indecent material contained in any of their
programs. Finally, the 1992 Cable Act requires the FCC to promul-
gate, within 180 days, regulations enabling a cable operator to prohibit
the use of "any channel capacity or any public, educational, or govern-
mental access facility for any programming which contains obscene
material, sexually explicit conduct, or material soliciting or promoting
unlawful conduct.
39
Given the politically charged nature of the "indecency" question,
it is not surprising that the Commission promulgated regulations
tracking the statutory language. Nonetheless, these regulations were
invalidated on First Amendment grounds in Alliance for Community
Media v. FCC,4  a panel decision that has been accepted by the Court
for en banc review but has yet to be decided. The unanimous panel
decision, however, written by Judge Wald, concluded that the specific
authorization to cable operators to exclude indecent material consti-
tuted governmental encouragement of content-based prohibitions
rather than mere authorizations. 41 As a governmental encourage-
ment, the regulations thus became, according to prevailing state action
principles,42 "responsible" for the subsequent actions of the private
actors. Since the state action had the effect of restricting sexually ori-
ented material without a finding of legal obscenity (and without fall-
ing within the highly uncertain scope of the "broadcasting" exception
of FCC v. Pacifica Foundation43), it constituted an infringement of the
First Amendment rights of cable operators and cable programmers.44
The Court of Appeals further held that the statutory and regulatory
requirements imposed on cable operators who did not choose "volun-
tarily" to restrict indecent programming were themselves sufficient to
constitute coercion. This conclusion rendered the statute and accom-
panying regulations an unconstitutional restriction on the use or show-
ing of material that was neither obscene nor fell under the arguably
39. Id. § 10(c).
40. 10 F.3d 812 (1993).
41. Id. at 818.
42. See Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967). The best analysis of Reitman and the
"encouragement" dimension of state action doctrine is Charles L. Black, Jr., Foreword:
"State Action," Equal Protection and California's Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REV. 69
(1967).
43. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
44. The Pacifica Foundation qualification aside, the leading authority for the imper-
missibility of "indecency" restrictions is Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115
(1989) (unanimously invalidating congressional efforts to restrict "indecent" fee-based tel-
ephone services).
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separate Pacifica Foundation principles applicable to broadcast, but,
under current law, not to cable.45
I want to stick to my earlier promise to avoid both predicting an
ultimate outcome of the Alliance for Community Media46 litigation
and suggesting an outcome to the courts. I do think it important to
situate the specific issue of cable operators' liability within a larger
history of concerns about legally imposed editorial responsibility for
materials distributed but not created by an entity that we might think
of as a "conduit."
TWo potentially conflicting strands of First Amendment doctrine
and theory are relevant here. One of these takes the "conduit" idea
seriously, and the leading case is Smith v. California.47 Smith stands
for the principle that excess deterrence of a communications interme-
diary (in Smith, a bookstore) by the threat of civil or criminal liability
imposed on the intermediary presents the same kind of chilling ef-
fect48 that excess deterrence of a primary communicator is thought to
present as a result of defamation law.49 As a problem of decision the-
ory, primary communicators (perhaps in this context cable program-
mers, but even more likely the creators and producers of individual
programs) recognize the possibility that in a world of some exposure
to legal liability they run the risk of mistaken liability (the false posi-
tive) and have the chance to benefit from mistaken nonliability (the
false negative). Rational primary communicators will seek to mini-
mize the false positives, but not at an excessive cost of minimizing too
much the benefits that engaging in risky behavior brings for them. For
example, if sexually explicit material bordering on the obscene
brought greater returns in the market than did less explicit material, a
producer of such material might risk mistaken impositions of liability
and operate close to (or over) the line because of the greater returns
available from engaging in risky behavior.50 Similarly, a speaker com-
45. See, e.g., Cruz v. Ferre, 755 F.2d 1415 (11th Cir. 1985); Community Television, Inc.
v. Wilkinson, 611 F. Supp. 1099 (C.D. Utah 1985), affd per curiam, 800 F.2d 989 (10th Cir.
1986), affid, 480 U.S. 926 (1987).
46. 10 F.3d 812 (D.C. Cir. 1993), vacated, 15 F.3d 186 (1994).
47. 361 U.S. 147 (1959).
48. See Stephen M. Renas et al., An Empirical Analysis of the Chilling Effect, in THE
COST OF LIBEL: ECONOMIC AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 41 (Everette Dennis & Eli Noam
eds., 1989); Frederick Schauer, Fear, Risk, and the First Amendment: Unraveling the "Chil-
ling Effect," 58 B.U. L. REV. 685 (1978).
49. It is useful to be reminded once again that the New York Times in New York Times
v. Sullivan was itself a conduit, merely publishing for money an advertisement created by
others.
50. The nature of the sanctions is of course highly relevant. People are more likely to
risk money than jail time, but jail time in obscenity cases is in practice reserved for serious
multiple offenders or those whose actual crime is some variant of child pornography.
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mitted to an ideology might, because of that commitment (or because
certain forms of discourse bring greater attention to the message de-
livered), find it more valuable to refer to a political opponent as, to
take a term now in frequent use in Australian parliamentary dis-
course, a "scumbag,"' rather than "the honorable gentleman," even if
the former phrase is for some reason riskier. Thus, in the case of pri-
mary communicators, running the risk of mistaken imposition of lia-
bility or punishment may bring sufficient benefits, financial or
otherwise, to explain why primary communicators frequently do not
adopt the most risk averse strategy.52
In some domains, there may be little benefit for the communica-
tor who plays it close to the line between liability and nonliability, for
some domains engaging in marginally risky activity brings no com-
mensurate marginal benefits. Information communication is one of
the best examples of this phenomenon. For any individual provider of
information, providing a marginal piece of information is likely to re-
sult in negligible benefits.53 If engaging in a communicative activity
close to the liability line (such as by publishing one more possibly false
statement about a public official in a country without the New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan rule) is unlikely to bring the communicator a
benefit commensurate with the increased risk of legal liability, com-
municators will choose risk-averse strategies. If we think the informa-
tion that might otherwise have been provided by a less risk-averse
information provider is a public good in the strict sense (if it is the
kind of speech that should be intrinsically protected54), it follows that
there may be reasons supporting the manipulation of the incentive
When jail time is hardly ever imposed, and the maximum financial penalties are compara-
tively small, as under existing criminal obscenity law, the incentives against engaging in
legally risky behavior turn out to be much less than a great deal of standard "chilling
effect" rhetoric supposes. But when, as in many broadcast or cable situations, the potential
penalty is some real possibility of a loss of a license or a franchise, the chilling phenomenon
may be substantial.
51. 1 am not making this up.
52. See Ronald A. Cass, Principle and Interest in Libel Law After New York Times, in
THE COST OF LIBEL, supra note 48, at 69.
53. See Ronald A. Cass, Commercial Speech, Constitutionalism, Collective Choice, 56
U. CIN. L. REV. 1317 (1988); Daniel Farber, Free Speech Without Romance: Public Choice
and the First Amendment, 105 HARV. L. REV. 554 (1991); Richard A. Posner, Free Speech
in an Economic Perspective, 20 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1 (1986); Frederick Schauer, Uncou-
pling Free Speech, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1321 (1992).
54. I say "intrinsically" in order to distinguish the speech we protect because we think
it valuable (for example, criticism of governmental policies) from the speech we protect
strategically because we want to make sure, by the creation of a buffer zone, that the
intrinsically valuable speech remains free. The point is emphasized in Ocala Star-Banner
v. Damron, 401 U.S. 295, 301 (1971) (White, J., concurring). See also Schauer, supra note
48, at 705-12.
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system. If calibrated properly, this manipulation could reduce the
likelihood of liability, and thus change the marginal risk-return calcu-
lation for the publisher of information. This would therefore serve to
make information available that might not otherwise see the light of
day were we to rely solely on the operation of an incentive system
based on the risk-return calculus applicable to other products. Just
because the manufacturer of chainsaws has a greater incentive to pro-
duce more chainsaws (although chainsaws produce a great possibility
of legal liability for the manufacturer) than an information provider
has to provide information, the liability rule applicable to chainsaws
must be adjusted to produce socially beneficial outcomes when the
product is information.
Now let us consider the question of intermediary liability in the
context of cable operators. If broadcasting indecent leased access or
public access material brings no greater return for the cable operator
than does broadcasting nonindecent material, but brings even the
smallest increase in the possibility of civil penalties or license nonre-
newal, then we can expect cable operators to behave in a risk-averse
fashion. Moreover, we can expect a cable operator to behave with far
more risk-aversion than, say, a programmer, who often foresees
greater benefits in taking greater legal risks. Thus, it should come as
no surprise that cable operators eagerly accepted the invitation to re-
strict in Section 10(a). 5 Careful consideration of the question of
cable operator responsibility, therefore, might suggest engaging in a
serious and empirically sound incentive analysis. Paradoxically, such
an analysis might produce the conclusion that Smith v. California
rested on empirically shaky foundations when decided, but neverthe-
less may apply in different circumstances now. The Smith Court as-
sumed that an increase in the possibility of liability would lead
booksellers to remove all legally risky books from their shelves. Were
it the case, however, hardly unlikely in 1959, that steamy books like
Miller's Tropic of Cancer and Lawrence's Lady Chatterly's Lover
would be big sellers and would bring large numbers of customers into
the bookstore, then the chilling effect of the absence of a scienter re-
quirement for the intermediary may have been less than the Court
supposed. By contrast, however, the benefits for the cable operator of
showing "indecent" leased access or public access material may be
much less than the benefits of stocking Tropic of Cancer for the 1959
bookstore. As a result, and not without some irony, the lessons of
55. See Alliance for Community Media v. FCC, 10 F.3d 812, 821-22 (D.C. Cir. 1993),
vacated, 15 F.3d 186 (1994).
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Smith may be more applicable to 1994 cable operators than they were
to 1959 bookstores.
IV
Although the foregoing takes on the question of the implications
of liability of cable operators as conduits, a tension exists between the
conduit characterization and the rhetoric of the cable operator as edi-
tor. This cable operator-as-editor rhetoric, quite apparent in the pre-
Turner Broadcasting case law56 persistently compares the cable opera-
tor to the newspaper in Miami Herald v. Tornillo.57 The argument
that supports the analogy is that the program selection decisions of the
cable operator are like the "what goes on the page" decisions of a
newspaper editor. Thus, the argument goes, the same policies that
protected the Miami Herald ought to protect the right of the cable
operator to decide how to fill the available programming hours.58
As noted above, this argument took a beating in Justice Ken-
nedy's opinion for the Court in Turner Broadcasting.59 Nevertheless,
that opinion relied heavily on its characterization of the must-carry
regulations as not content-based. Thus, the issue remains open
whether the Tornillo analogy will remain sound if cases which involve
more blatant content-based restrictions on cable operators, such as
those discussed here, arrive in the Supreme Court.
Anyone who reads Tornillo will immediately recognize the ad-
vantages of characterizing oneself as an editor. People, institutions,
and conduct are frequently susceptible to multiple characterizations.
Faculty members, for example, are professionals, employees, and in-
dependent contractors; deciding which characterization to pick may
depend on the consequences of picking one or another among equally
plausible and not mutually exclusive characterizations. The same pro-
ject on the philosophy of law may be characterized as philosophy for
purposes of applying for grants from foundations supporting philoso-
phy and as law for purposes of applying for grants from foundations
56. See, e.g., Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. de-
nied, 476 U.S. 1169 (1986); Tele-Communications of Key West, Inc. v. United States, 757
F.2d 1330 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Preferred Communications, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 754
F.2d 1396 (9th Cir. 1985), after remand from 476 U.S. 488 (1986). Cf Berkshire Cablevi-
sion, Inc. v. Burke, 571 F. Supp. 976 (D.R.I. 1983), vacated on other grounds, 773 F.2d 382
(1st Cir. 1985). See generally Michael I. Meyerson, The First Amendment and the Cable
Television Operator, 4 COMM/ENT L.J. 1 (1981).
57. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
58. Id.
59. 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994), vacating and remanding 819 F. Supp. 32 (D.D.C. 1993),
reh'g denied, 115 S. Ct. 30 (1994).
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supporting research about the law. Similarly, if the First Amendment
protected sex and not speech, then we might discover that activities
characterizable both as sex and speech, like the "loop" at a typical
"peep show," would more commonly be characterized as sex rather
than speech. So if we assume that cable operators can characterize
themselves with some plausibility both as conduits and as editors, we
then want to ask why a cable operator would choose one or the other
characterization for purposes of public rhetoric, political argument,
and legal strategy.
Tornillo made clear that advantages flow from being an editor
because great advantages typically (but not universally) flow from be-
ing exempt from government regulation. Institutions want to be edi-
tors and not conduits precisely because the First Amendment protects
the former but not the latter. Cable companies have traditionally
analogized themselves to newspapers and not to broadcasters 60 not
because it is intrinsically better to be like a newspaper than it is to be
like a broadcaster. Indeed, for public relations and competitive mar-
ket purposes it would seem just the opposite, since cable television
displaces broadcast television 6' for far more people than it displaces
the print press. Nevertheless, Tornillo, Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v.
FCC,62 and FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, taken together, make it obvi-
ous that one is more immunized from government regulation when
treated as a newspaper rather than a broadcaster. So it is no surprise
that cable programmers and cable operators have tried so hard to act
as if they were newspapers. If the Constitution protects editors but
not common carriers, and if freedom from government restriction is
the goal, then it is better to be an editor than a common carrier. If the
goal is to be able to act without governmental interference, a goal of
many individuals and institutions, then there are obvious advantages
in defining yourself so as to secure the maximum legal and constitu-
tional immunity from regulation.
Although we can understand the strategic advantages for cable
operators in defining themselves as editors, the analogy, as Justice
Kennedy noted in Turner Broadcasting, often seems strained.63 And
that is because the editor analogy is itself at least one step removed
from the primary First Amendment archetype of a speaker speaking
her mind, or of a Zenger-like editor publishing a newspaper of com-
60. See cases cited supra note 56.
61, More accurately, shows available to cable subscribers only on cable displace shows
available to households without cable.
62. 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (upholding on scarcity grounds the constitutionality of FCC
fairness doctrine against First Amendment challenge).
63. 114 S. Ct. at 2464-67.
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mentary that is soaked with political opinion in every paragraph and
on every page. Yet when we consider the cable operator selections
from alternatives to fill its channels, we see a pale image of the edito-
rial function at work. Rather, we see many more decisions guided
exclusively by business concerns, or, when there is no scarcity, no
choices at all. As a result, the analogy between the program "selec-
tion" by the typical cable operator and the activity of the speaker de-
ciding what she wants to say is, to put it mildly, tenuous.
I do not intend this line of argument to suggest that cable opera-
tors should be controlled. Rather, I want to suggest that the skepti-
cism of Justice Kennedy and the Court majority in Turner
Broadcasting about the Tornillo analogy should come as little surprise.
The question whether cable operators should be controlled is not
likely to be advanced by treating the cable operator as some sort of
Speakers' Corner orator or colonial printing press patriot. Rather, the
question is one more likely to be answered, especially after Turner
Broadcasting, on the basis of administrative, legislative, and judicial
decisions about the kind of programming that ought to be available on
this increasingly dominant medium. Once that decision is made, cable
operators are likely to be put into the legal and conceptual category
most suitable to furthering that goal.
In confronting this post-Turner Broadcasting environment, cable
operators will be tempted to continue to fight the seemingly losing
battle to be treated as editors and not as conduits or common carriers.
They may believe that there is still a chance of being so treated in
cases not involving the must-carry regulations. They may further be-
lieve that being seen as editors, both publicly and politically, will help
them avoid excess regulation at the earlier administrative and legisla-
tive stages.
Yet this approach deserves a second look, and indecency regula-
tion may once again provide a useful way of thinking about this larger
issue. Section 10 finds its way into the 1992 Cable Act precisely be-
cause there are millions of people who believe, sincerely, that there is
too much sex on television, in the movies, in art, in books, in
magazines, in newspapers, and elsewhere in modem life. That view is
not one I share, although I do believe that there are too many en-
dorsements of violence against women in the mass media and in popu-
lar culture, and that many of those endorsements of violence against
women are sexualized. Still, given that Section 10 applies only to pub-
lic access and leased access channels, leaving commercial channels un-
touched, it may be best to view Section 10 as a symbol, in much the
same way that a great deal of the recent controversy about federal
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funding of the arts has been symbolic. When the issue becomes sym-
bolic, it becomes especially important that the symbol send out the
correct message. That is why even if existing First Amendment doc-
trine were to be transformed to allow indecency regulation outside of
the broadcast media (which I do not think it should be), I would still
disagree with the entire point of the indecency enterprise.
I now return to the question of nonlegal responsibility, with
which I opened this Article. On the question of nonlegal responsibil-
ity, the issue of leased access and public access channels is somewhat
beside the point. Normally, we consider questions of editorial respon-
sibility in the context of there being some actual room for editorial
choice. When that room is absent, as it is with respect to leased access
and public access cable television, it does not make much sense to
think about nonlegal responsibility.
When we leave the narrower issue of leased access and public
access, however, the question of editorial responsibility for program-
ming decisions is quite different. Were cable operators, even after
Turner Broadcasting, to persist with their we-are-editors-and-not-con-
duits rhetoric, they might find themselves increasingly subject to criti-
cism for the choices they are actually making. And here there may be
an intriguing case study in public perception. It is probably fair to
assume that many of those same people who object to sexually explicit
cable programming also object to sexually explicit pay-per-call tele-
phone services.' Yet we rarely hear the telephone companies
describing themselves as editors making editorial choices. Further-
more, the telephone companies have in general continued the com-
mon carrier rhetoric from earlier years. By contrast, cable operators,
who could have but did not continue common carrier rhetoric and
pursue common carrier treatment, have in the recent past moved in
the direction of "editor" rhetoric. We have seen some of the reasons
for this phenomenon, but the question of nonlegal responsibility sug-
gests the issue may be more complex. Editors make choices, and edi-
tors are criticized and punished in various nonlegal ways for the
choices they make. Boycotts have been and will remain a prime
example.
Cable operators might take a good look at the current situation of
the television networks as they sit on the hot seat with respect to nu-
merous issues, especially that of television violence. The post-Turner
Broadcasting period is a good time for cable operators to reconsider
the characterization that best serves their interests-legally, politi-
64. This is clear from Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
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cally, and economically. As the cable operators watch the network
executives squirm in public and worry even more about boycotts when
they are not in public, they might therefore want to reconsider before
deciding too easily that editors are what they really want to be.
